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1 Introduction
Since Eaton and Grossman (1986), one of the major criticisms of the strategic trade literature has been its
non-robustness to the mode of market competition. If trade policy is sensitive to the choice of strategic
variable by ﬁrms and governments are uncertain about the mode of competition then strategic trade policy
can be more harmful than beneﬁcial. In this paper, we analyze export subsidies when ﬁrms invest in
cost-reducing R&D before the market competition stage. Governments choose export subsidies ﬁrst. After
observing governments’ choice, ﬁrms invest in R&D and then compete in a third market (in prices or
quantities). We ﬁnd that for suﬃciently cost eﬀective R&D1 governments subsidize exports independently
of the mode of competition. This suggests that export subsidies are more robust to the type of the market
competition than implied by the recent literature.
Several authors have studied the robustness of strategic trade policy using two kinds of models. In the
ﬁrst kind, in a two-stage game, governments ﬁrst commit to output subsidies and then ﬁrms compete in the
market. Using this approach Brander and Spencer (1985) show that the optimal trade policy is an export
subsidy under Cournot competition. Eaton and Grossman (1986), however, show that the optimal strategic
trade policy reverses to an export tax if ﬁrms compete in prices.2 This policy reversal highlights the lack of
robustness of strategic trade policy when governments are uncertain about the mode of competition.
In the second kind of models, actions are chosen in a three-stage game: governments ﬁrst commit to a
policy, ﬁrms then invest in R&D and later compete in the market. In such models, investing in a strate-
gic variable before the market competition stage captures entry barriers, a feature that is fundamental to
oligopolistic market structures (see Sutton, 1991). A further appeal of these models is that they capture ﬁrm
commitment to a strategic variable before the competition stage (Grossman, 1988). If ﬁrms can make sunk
investments before the market competition stage then governments have two instruments at their disposal:
output and R&D subsidies. If governments use only R&D policy Bagwell and Staiger (1994) show that gov-
ernments subsidize R&D under both Cournot and Bertrand Competition.3 Based on this, Brander (1995)
suggests that R&D subsidies seem more robust than output subsidies. Neary and Leahy (2000), however,
dispute Brander’s claim.4 They show that when governments use two instruments (an output and a R&D
subsidy at the same time) then both instruments are not robust to the nature of market competition.5
This paper adds another argument against the claim that R&D subsidies are more robust than output
subsidies. If governments only subsidize exports and ﬁrms invest in R&D (before competing in the market),
we show that the optimal trade policy is an export subsidy under both Cournot and Bertrand competition,
provided R&D is suﬃciently cost-eﬀective. This means that output policy is more robust than previously
1We refer to the cost-eﬀectiveness of R&D as the eﬀect of R&D on marginal costs relative to the cost of investing in R&D.
2The reversal in the optimal export policy is explained by the fact that outputs are strategic substitutes and prices are
strategic complements. See Brander (1995) for a discussion on this.
3Spencer and Brander (1983) had shown the optimality of R&D subsidies under Cournot competition. Bagwell and Staiger
(1994) develop a model where the eﬀect of R&D investment is stochastic. In the case where R&D reduces the mean but does
not aﬀect the variance of costs (the closest case to deterministic R&D), they ﬁnd that R&D should be subsidized under both
Cournot and Bertrand competition. Maggi (1996) ﬁnds a similar result in a model where ﬁrms invest in capacities (instead of
R&D) before the competition stage. The optimal policy in his model is to subsidize capacities.
4See Neary and Leahy (2000), page 505.
5Neary and Leahy (2000) show that under Cournot competition governments subsidize exports and tax R&D, a result found
in Spencer and Brander (1983). However, under Bertrand competition, governments will tax exports and subsidize R&D.
The intuition is that governments use export policy to shift proﬁts from foreign ﬁrms (as in models without R&D) and use
R&D policy to correct the distortion on R&D generated by the strategic behavior of ﬁrms. Therefore, if governments use two
instruments, strategic policy in the presence of R&D is no longer robust to changes in the mode of competition.
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considered by the literature. This is true especially in industries where the marginal cost of R&D is not too
high relative to its eﬀect on process innovation.
The papers closest to ours are Spencer and Brander (1983) and Neary and Leahy (2000). Spencer and
Brander (1983) show that governments impose an output subsidy under Cournot competition when ﬁrms
can invest in R&D before competing in the market. They analyze two cases that are diﬀerent to ours. First,
they show the optimality of output subsidies if they are set by governments after ﬁrms decide their R&D
investment. Second, they show that output subsidies are optimal if they are set jointly with R&D subsidies
before R&D is chosen by ﬁrms. In the ﬁrst part of our paper, we extend their results to the case when R&D
subsidies are not available and the government chooses output subsidies before ﬁrms invest in R&D.
In a numerical simulation, Neary and Leahy (2000) show that if governments only use output subsidies
then the Eaton and Grossman trade policy reversal from Cournot to Bertrand competition is still observed
when ﬁrms invest in R&D before the market competition stage. In this paper, we show that their result
holds only when R&D is relatively ineﬀective at reducing marginal costs. Our result becomes clear once one
realizes that the eﬀect of R&D on proﬁts depends on the level of output. Due to output expansion, an export
subsidy increases the ability of domestic R&D to shift proﬁts from the foreign ﬁrm. Output expansion, due
to the output subsidy, occurs under both Cournot and Bertrand competition. Therefore, only looking at
R&D, governments have the incentive to subsidize exports both under price and quantity competition.
The sign of the optimal policy depends upon the net eﬀect of the export subsidy on the R&D and the
market competition stage. In a model without R&D, the sign of the strategic trade policy depends on the
strategic complementarity or substitutability of the variables chosen by ﬁrms in the market competition
stage. Under R&D and Cournot competition, a unilateral export subsidy increases welfare both through
its eﬀect on R&D and on output. This means that governments want to subsidize exports (Spencer and
Brander, 1983). Under Bertrand competition, however, the two eﬀects have the opposite sign. If R&D is
suﬃciently cost eﬀective then R&D will be relatively elastic with respect to an export subsidy. This high
elasticity of R&D will make the eﬀect of the output subsidy on the R&D stage stronger than the eﬀect on the
price competition stage. In this case, governments subsidize output under Bertrand competition. Conversely,
if R&D is not suﬃciently cost-eﬀective then the eﬀect of an output subsidy on the price competition stage
dominates the eﬀect on the R&D stage and the optimal policy under Bertrand competition is an output tax.
We use the standard third country model of strategic trade as in Spencer and Brander (1983). Two ﬁrms,
one located in each country, produce a diﬀerentiated good which is exported to a third country. There is
no domestic consumption and welfare is measured as producer surplus (proﬁts) net of subsidy costs.6 In a
three stage game of complete information, the domestic government ﬁrst sets an output subsidy s1. This
is followed by both ﬁrms simultaneously deciding their investment in cost-reducing R&D (∆i and ∆j). In
the third stage, ﬁrms compete in the product market simultaneously choosing quantities, or prices. We also
assume that governments commit to an export subsidy while ﬁrms commit to their investment in R&D.
We proceed as follows: in section 2 we analyze output subsidies under Cournot competition. In section 3
we perform the same analysis under Bertrand competition. Section 4 presents a numerical simulation that
highlights the eﬀect of the convexity of the cost of R&D on the optimal trade policy. Section 5 concludes.
6Public funds may have an opportunity cost bigger than one (as in Neary [1994]). We abstract from this issue in this analysis.
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2 Cournot Competition
In the ﬁrst stage of the game, government 1 chooses an export subsidy. Then ﬁrms choose R&D investment.
Output is chosen in the third stage of the game. R&D investment generates a process innovation of size ∆i
(by ﬁrm i), imposing a monetary cost of φ(∆i) upon the ﬁrm. The monetary cost is increasing and convex
in the extent of process innovation and reduces total and marginal costs of production. Denoting ﬁrms by
superscripts and derivatives by subscripts these assumptions translate into:
Ci∆ =
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i
≤ 0, Ci∆∆ =
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂ (∆i)2
≥ 0, Cix∆ =
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi
≤ 0 (1)
φii(∆
i) > 0, φiii(∆
i) > 0 (2)
The choice of R&D investment is irreversible and simultaneous for both ﬁrms. We assume that goods are
imperfect substitutes and that the own-price eﬀect dominates the cross-price eﬀect:7
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xi
<
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xj
< 0 (3)
The following assumptions concern the behavior of revenues Ri(xi, xj) = xipi(xi, xj):
Riii(x
i, xj) = xi
∂2pi(xi, xj)
∂ (xi)2
+ 2
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xi
< 0 (4)
Rijj(x
i, xj) = xi
∂2pi(xi, xj)
∂ (xj)2
≥ 0 (5)
Riij(x
i, xj) = xi
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xi∂xj
+
∂pi(xi, xj)
∂xj
< 0 (6)
Assumption (4) states that the revenue is concave in own quantity, and is satisﬁed by demand functions that
are not too convex. Assumption (5) states that revenue decreases (at a decreasing rate) with an increase in
the other ﬁrm’s output. This is true in particular for linear demands. Lastly, (6) states that an increase in
sales of one good decreases marginal revenue of the other (again satisﬁed in the case of a linear demand).
Suppose that government 1 subsidizes exports giving a per-unit output subsidy, s1, to its domestic ﬁrm.
The proﬁt function of ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 can then be written as,
Π¯1(x1, x2,∆1, s1) = R1(x1, x2)− C1(x1,∆1)− φ(∆1) + s1x1 = Π1(x1, x2,∆1) + s1x1 (7)
Π¯2(x1, x2,∆2) = Π2(x1, x2,∆2) = R2(x1, x2)− C2(x2,∆2)− φ(∆2) (8)
The net domestic beneﬁt of country 1 is simply the proﬁt of the domestic ﬁrm minus the cost of the subsidy,
B¯1(s1) = Π¯1(x1, x2,∆1, s1)− s1x1 = Π1(x1, x2,∆1)
2.1 Final Stage: Quantity Competition
In the ﬁnal stage, ﬁrms choose output, xi, to maximize proﬁts, Π¯i(x1, x2,∆i, s1). The ﬁrst order condition
for the two ﬁrms gives us the following expressions:
Π¯11 = R
1
1(x
1, x2)− C1x(x
1,∆1) + s1 = 0 (9)
7Strictly speaking, the condition for the own price eﬀect to dominate the cross price eﬀect is
(
∂pi(xi,xj)
∂xj
)2
<
(
∂pi(xi,xj)
∂xi
)2
.
In this paper we restrict our attention to the case of imperfect substitutes, that is ∂p
i(xi,xj)
∂xj
< 0.
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Π¯22 = R
2
2(x
1, x2)− C2x(x
2,∆2) = 0 (10)
with second order condition:8
Π¯iii = R
i
ii(x
i, xj)− Cixx(x
i,∆i) < 0 (11)
We assume that the second order condition is always satisﬁed.9 Note that assumption (6) implies that
quantities are strategic substitutes, and therefore output reaction functions are negatively sloped.
For later use we need to assume that the own eﬀect of output on marginal proﬁt is stronger (greater in
absolute value) than the cross eﬀect, that is, Π¯iii < Π¯
i
ij. This then implies that:
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 − Π¯
1
12Π¯
2
12 > 0 (12)
The solution of the two equations in (9) gives us equilibrium outputs (as a function of R&D levels chosen
in the second stage and the output subsidy chosen by government 1 in the ﬁrst stage):
xi = q¯i(∆i,∆j , s1) (13)
Totally diﬀerentiating the two ﬁrst order conditions (9) and (10) we obtain the eﬀect of R&D on output
(keeping the output subsidy constant):10
q¯i∆i(∆
i,∆j , s1) =
dxi
d∆i
=
Π¯jjjC
i
x∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj −R
j
ijR
i
ij
=
Π¯jjjC
i
x∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
> 0 (14)
q¯i∆j (∆
i,∆j , s1) =
dxi
d∆j
=
−RiijC
j
x∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj −R
j
ijR
i
ij
=
−Π¯iijC
j
x∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
< 0 (15)
where the inequalities come from (1), (6) and (11). The intuition is straightforward: an increase in R&D
expenditure reduces the marginal cost of production and thus shifts out the reaction curve of ﬁrm i. Given
that reaction functions are downward sloping, this implies that ﬁrm i produces more output while ﬁrm j
produces less. The eﬀect of the subsidy (s1) on output is also determined by the eﬀect the output subsidy
has on R&D of both ﬁrms. Keeping R&D levels ∆1 and ∆2 ﬁxed, the partial eﬀects are,
q¯1s1(∆
1,∆2, s1)
∣
∣
∆1,∆2 constant
=
−Π¯222
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 −R
2
12R
1
12
> 0 (16)
q¯2s1(∆
1,∆2, s1)
∣
∣
∆1,∆2 constant
=
R212
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 −R
2
12R
1
12
=
Π¯212
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 − Π¯
2
12Π¯
1
12
< 0 (17)
The partial eﬀects state that own output is increasing in own (subsidy) and decreasing in the other
subsidy. However, R&D levels are inﬂuenced by the choice of output subsidies. Therefore, the total eﬀect of
a change in s1 should take this into account. (Expressions for q¯1
s1
and q¯2
s1
above would be relevant if output
subsidies are chosen after R&D levels are set.)
8Note that Π¯iii = Π
i
ii and Π¯
i
ij = Π
i
ij are the same as under free trade.
9This will be satisﬁed if marginal costs are increasing or do not decrease faster than marginal revenue.
10Full details of the derivation of most mathematical expressions in this paper can be found in Kujal and Ruiz (2003).
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2.2 R&D investment
In the R&D (i.e. second) stage, we can rewrite the proﬁt of a ﬁrm as a function of R&D and output subsidies:
π¯i(∆i,∆j , s1) = Π¯i(q¯i(∆i,∆j , s1), q¯j(∆i,∆j , s1),∆i, s1) = Ri(q¯i, q¯j)− Ci(q¯i,∆i) − φ
i(∆i) + s1q¯i. The ﬁrst
order condition for a Nash equilibrium in the choice of R&D is given by the same ﬁrst order condition as in
the case of free trade:
π¯i∆i(∆
i,∆j , s1) = Rij(x
i, xj)q¯j∆i(∆
i,∆j , s1)− Ci∆(x
i,∆i)− φii(∆
i) = 0 (18)
With the second order condition,
π¯i∆i∆i(∆
i,∆j , s1) = Rij q¯
j
∆i∆i + q¯
j
∆i
dRij(x
i, xj)
d∆i
− Cix∆q¯
i
∆i − C
i
∆∆ − φ
i
ii < 0. (19)
Where,
dRij(x
i,xj)
d∆i = R
i
ij(x
i, xj)q¯i∆i + R
i
jj(x
i, xj)q¯j∆i < 0 (by (5), (6), (14) and (15)) and q¯
j
∆i
dRij(x
i,xj)
d∆i −
Cix∆q¯
i
∆i > 0.
11
We now assume a condition similar to (12). It refers to the eﬀect of R&D on proﬁts. Again, assuming
that own eﬀect of R&D on marginal proﬁts is stronger (bigger in absolute value) than the cross eﬀect (i.e.
π¯i∆i∆i < π¯
i
∆i∆j ) we get
π¯i∆i∆i π¯
j
∆j∆j − π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
j
∆i∆j > 0. (20)
Note that using (1), (3), (5), (6), (14), (15) and the assumption that marginal costs are constant with respect
to output (so that q¯j∆i∆j = 0), gives us
πiij = q¯
j
∆i
(
Riij(x
i, xj)q¯i∆j +R
i
jj(x
i, xj)q¯j∆j
)
− Cix∆q¯
i
∆j < 0. (21)
Thus, R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes and R&D reaction functions are negatively sloped.
To understand (21), notice that ﬁrm i sets its R&D ∆i to satisfy (18). An inﬁnitesimal increase in ∆i
increases proﬁts for ﬁrm i since the total cost of production is reduced. Further, the quantity produced
by ﬁrm j in the last stage also declines which, in turn, increases the revenues of ﬁrm i.12 This increase in
revenues has to be compared with the cost of increasing R&D φii(∆
i).
Consider now an increase in R&D by ﬁrm j (∆j). An increase in R&D by ﬁrm j increases its own quantity
and reduces the quantity of ﬁrm i. The most important eﬀect is the reduction in xi (for linear demands the
eﬀect on xj vanishes), since a lower output implies that own R&D (∆i) is less eﬀective at increasing proﬁts.
Since the marginal cost of R&D for ﬁrm 1 does not change, this implies that the optimal level of R&D for
ﬁrm 1 has to be lower after an increase in ∆j . Hence
d∆i
d∆j < 0.
2.3 Output subsidies
In order to see the eﬀect of output subsidies on R&D investment, we totally diﬀerentiate the two ﬁrst order
conditions for the R&D stage. The following proposition states the eﬀect of an output subsidy on the
equilibrium R&D of both ﬁrms.
11Note that even if we assume that marginal costs are constant with respect to output and linear with respect to R&D, (i.e.
q¯
j
∆i∆i
= 0) we still need to ensure that Ci
∆∆
+ φiii is big enough for (19) to hold. This implies that as R&D increases its
cost-eﬀectiveness has to decline fast enough.
12Because of the envelope theorem, the eﬀect of an inﬁnitesimal change on ﬁrm i’s R&D on proﬁts through its eﬀect on the
quantity produced by ﬁrm i can be ignored
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Figure 1: Cournot competition: Eﬀect of an output subsidy s imposed by government 1.
Proposition 1 An output subsidy by the domestic government increases the equilibrium level of R&D chosen
by the domestic firm and reduces the R&D level chosen by the foreign firm. That is,
d∆1
ds1
> 0 (22)
d∆2
ds1
< 0. (23)
Proof. See appendix.
Proposition 1 states that an increase in the subsidy s1 shifts the reaction function of both ﬁrms in R&D
space. The reaction function of ﬁrm 1 shifts outwards while the reaction function of ﬁrm 2 shifts inwards.
This is illustrated in the left half of ﬁgure 1. An output subsidy s1 moves the equilibrium in the R&D
space from point C (free trade) to point S. This implies that for a small increment in its output subsidy,
ﬁrm 1 will be inside its isoproﬁt contour (π1) passing through the free trade equilibrium point C. This
analysis, however, does not take into account the eﬀect of output subsidies in output space (i.e. in the third
stage). The eﬀect in the output competition stage is illustrated on the right side of ﬁgure 1. Notice that an
output subsidy s1, imposed by government 1, increases domestic R&D and lowers foreign R&D (as seen in
the left half of ﬁgure 1). This reduces domestic marginal costs beyond the direct eﬀect of the subsidy and
increases foreign marginal costs. In output space, this means that the domestic output reaction function
shifts out and the foreign reaction function shifts in. The resulting equilibrium is at point S, which is inside
the isoproﬁt contour (π1) that passes through the free trade equilibrium at point C. Therefore, an output
subsidy increases welfare for the domestic country both through R&D and output.
To obtain the optimal output subsidy these two eﬀects need to be included. The net beneﬁt of government
1 is B¯1(s1) = π¯1(∆1,∆2, s1)− s1x1. Diﬀerentiating B¯1(s1) with respect to s1 we obtain,
∂B¯1
∂s1
= π¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ π¯1s1 − x
1
− s1
dq¯1
ds1
. (24)
Recall that, π¯1s1 = R
1
2(x
1, x2)q¯2s1(∆
1,∆2, s1) + x1 and π¯1∆1 = 0 from the R&D stage. Further,
dq¯1
ds1
= q¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ q¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ q¯1s1 > 0. (25)
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This last inequality simply states that the total eﬀect of an output subsidy on equilibrium output is positive,
i.e. an output subsidy makes a ﬁrm in that country more competitive in the output stage (q¯1
s1
> 0). Further,
an output subsidy reduces foreign R&D while increasing domestic R&D in the second stage. This in turn
beneﬁts domestic production, i.e. q¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ q¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
> 0. Given this, ∂B¯
1
∂s1
simpliﬁes to
∂B¯1
∂s1
= π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+R12q¯
2
s1 − s
1dq¯
1
ds1
= R12
(
q¯2∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ q¯2s1
)
− s1
dq¯1
ds1
. (26)
The ﬁrst term reﬂects the eﬀect of the output subsidy on domestic beneﬁt in the second (R&D) stage.13
The output subsidy reduces foreign R&D (∆2) resulting in an increase in domestic proﬁts. As a result, the
eﬀect of a subsidy s1 on beneﬁts in the second stage is positive. The second term captures what happens
in the third (output) stage: an increase in the subsidy s1 reduces the quantity produced by the foreign ﬁrm
resulting in an increase in domestic revenues (and proﬁts). The third term reﬂects the increased subsidy
expenditure brought about by an increased production for the domestic ﬁrm s1 dq¯
1
ds1
. The sign of the expression
∂B¯1
∂s1
is determined by the net of the three eﬀects pointed out above. Notice that, starting from a subsidy s1
equal to zero, an inﬁnitesimal increase in the output subsidy increases domestic beneﬁt for the subsidizing
country as both the output eﬀect
(
q¯2
s1
)
and the R&D eﬀect
(
q¯2∆2
d∆2
ds1
)
move in the same direction.
∂B¯1
∂s1
∣∣∣∣
s1=0
= π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+R12q¯
2
s1 > 0 (27)
To obtain the precise expression for the optimal output subsidy we set ∂B¯
1
∂s1
= 0:
Proposition 2 When firms compete à la Cournot, the optimal output subsidy s1∗ is positive:
s1∗ =
π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+R12q¯
2
s1
d q¯1
ds1
=
R12
(
q¯2∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ q¯2
s1
)
q¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ q¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ q¯1
s1
> 0 (28)
Proof. Immediate from (26)
This proposition extends the results in Spencer and Brander (1983). They analyze the case when an
output subsidy is set after ﬁrms invest in R&D and before they choose output. They ﬁnd that the optimal
output subsidy is positive. They also analyze the case of subsidies to R&D and output before the R&D
stage, ﬁnding that output subsidies are also positive. Here we have shown that output subsidies are also
positive under Cournot competition if subsidies are set before R&D investment.
Note that the separation into two eﬀects related to each of the two stages in which ﬁrms play will be
useful to characterize the solution in the case of Bertrand competition.
3 Bertrand Competition
Consider again a three—stage game. In stage 1, government 1 imposes an output subsidy s1. In the second
stage, ﬁrms simultaneously choose R&D. In the last stage, ﬁrms compete in prices. We assume that goods
are imperfect substitutes and that the own-price eﬀect dominates the cross-price eﬀect,
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
< 0 <
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pj
(29)∣∣∣∣∂xi(pi, pj)∂pi
∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣∂xi(pi, pj)∂pj
∣∣∣∣ . (30)
13Since ﬁrm 1 is choosing R&D, ∆1, to maximize proﬁts then an inﬁnitesimal output subsidy s1will not aﬀect beneﬁts.
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Using previous notation, revenues and costs can be written as, Rˆi(pi, pj) = xi(pi, pj)·pi = Ri(xi(pi, pj), xj(pi, pj))
and Cˆi(pi, pj,∆i) = Ci(xi(pi, pj),∆i), respectively. Revenues are assumed to satisfy the following properties:
Rˆiii(p
i, pj) = pi
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂ (pi)2
+ 2
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
< 0 (31)
Rˆijj(p
i, pj) = pi
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂ (pj)2
≥ 0 (32)
Rˆiij(p
i, pj) = pi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi∂pj
+
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pj
> 0 (33)
Assumption (31) states that revenue is concave in its own price, a property which is satisﬁed by demand
functions that are not too convex. Assumption (32) is the standard case where revenue is increasing, at
a non-decreasing rate, in the other ﬁrm’s price. This property, in particular, is satisﬁed by linear demand
functions. Lastly, (33) states that an increase in the price of one good increases marginal revenue for the
other ﬁrm. This is again satisﬁed in the case of linear demand.
We make the following assumptions about costs (which are equivalent to (1) and (2) in the Cournot case):
Cˆi∆ =
∂Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
∂∆i
≤ 0, Cˆi∆∆ =
∂2Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
∂ (∆i)2
≥ 0,
Cˆipi∆ =
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
> 0, Cˆipj∆ =
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pj
< 0 (34)
φii(∆
i) > 0, φiii(∆
i) > 0
Cˆipi =
∂Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
∂pi
=
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂xi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
< 0
Cˆipipi =
∂2Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
(∂pi)2
=
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂xi
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂ (pi)2
+
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂ (xi)2
(
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
)2
≥ 0
Cˆipipj =
∂2Cˆi(pi, pj ,∆i)
∂pi∂pj
=
∂Ci(xi,∆i)
∂xi
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂pi∂pj
+
∂2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂ (xi)2
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pi
∂xi(pi, pj)
∂pj
≤ 0. (35)
The proﬁt function of ﬁrm 1 and ﬁrm 2 can now be written as:
Π¯1(p1, p2,∆1, s1) = Rˆ1(p1, p2)− Cˆ1(p1, p2,∆1)− φ(∆1) + s1 · x1(p1, p2) (36)
= Π1(p1, p2,∆1) + s1 · x1(p1, p2) (37)
Π¯2(p1, p2,∆2) = Π2(p1, p2,∆2) = Rˆ2(p1, p2)− Cˆ2(p1, p2,∆2)− φ(∆2). (38)
The net domestic beneﬁt of country 1 is simply the proﬁt of the domestic ﬁrm minus the cost of the subsidy:
B¯1(s1) = Π¯1(p1, p2,∆1, s1)− s1 · x1(p1, p2) = Π1(p1, p2,∆1).
3.1 Last Stage: Price Competition
In the ﬁrst stage, ﬁrms maximize Π¯1(p1, p2,∆1, s1) and Π¯2(p1, p2,∆2) choosing the price p1 and p2, respec-
tively. The ﬁrst order conditions to this problem are:
Π¯11 = Rˆ
1
1(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p1(p
1, p2,∆1) + s1
∂x1
∂p1
= 0 (39)
Π¯22 = Rˆ
2
2(p
1, p2)− Cˆ2p2(p
1, p2,∆2) = 0 (40)
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with the second order conditions:14
Π¯111 = Rˆ
1
11(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p1p1(p
1, pj ,∆1) + s1
∂2x1
∂ (p1)2
< 0 (41)
Π¯222 = Rˆ
2
22(p
1, p2)− Cˆ2p2p2(p
1, p2,∆2) < 0
We assume that the second order conditions are satisﬁed.
For later use we need to assume that the own eﬀect of output on marginal proﬁts is stronger (bigger in
absolute value) than the cross eﬀect, that is
∣∣Π¯iii∣∣ > ∣∣Π¯iij∣∣ . This implies that
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 − Π¯
1
12Π¯
2
12 > 0 (42)
Note that assumptions (33) and (35) imply that the cross-partial derivative of proﬁts is positive (Π¯iij > 0)
for country 2. That is also the case for country 1 as long as ∂x
i(pi,pj)
∂pi∂pj
is not too big, which we assume. In
that case, prices are strategic complements and price reaction functions are positively sloped. That is, along
a price reaction function,
dpi
dpj
= −
Π¯iij
Π¯iii
> 0 (43)
This is a standard result for Bertrand games with diﬀerentiated products.
The solution to the two equations (39) and (40) gives us prices as a function of the R&D levels of both
ﬁrms (chosen in the previous stage) and output subsidy s1,
pi = ψ¯
i
(∆i,∆j , s1) (44)
To see the eﬀect of R&D investment and subsidies on prices, we diﬀerentiate the two ﬁrst order conditions
given in (39) and (40). We obtain
ψ¯
i
∆i(∆
i,∆j , s1) =
dpi
d∆i
=
Π¯jjjCˆ
i
pi∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
< 0 (45)
ψ¯
i
∆j (∆
i,∆j , s1) =
dpi
d∆j
=
−Π¯iijCˆ
j
pj∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
< 0 (46)
where the inequalities come from (33), (34), (35) and (41). The expressions above state that prices are
decreasing both in domestic and foreign R&D. An increase in R&D expenditure reduces the marginal cost
of production shifting the reaction curve of ﬁrm i downwards. Given that prices are strategic complements,
this implies that both ﬁrm i and ﬁrm j charge a lower price.
Given that the output subsidy is chosen before ﬁrms decide on their R&D, the eﬀect of the subsidy on
prices has to take into account how it aﬀects the choice of R&D by both ﬁrms. The partial eﬀects, keeping
R&D levels (∆1 and ∆2) constant, are:
ψ¯
1
s1(∆
1,∆2, s1)
∣∣∣
∆1,∆2 constant
=
−Π¯222
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 − Π¯
2
12Π¯
1
12
< 0 (47)
ψ¯
2
s1(∆
1,∆2, s1)
∣∣∣
∆1,∆2 constant
=
Π¯212
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π¯111Π¯
2
22 − Π¯
2
12Π¯
1
12
< 0. (48)
14Note that, for linear demands, Π¯iii = Π
i
ii and Π¯
i
ij = Π
i
ij are the same as in the case of free trade since
∂2x1
∂(p1)2
= 0.
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Notice that we assume that R&D levels are kept constant, while in fact they are inﬂuenced by the choice of
output subsidies. The total eﬀect of a change in s1, therefore, has to also take this into account.15
In order to obtain the eﬀect of imposing an output subsidy (before R&D takes place), we turn now to
the R&D stage.
3.2 R&D investment
Rewrite the proﬁt of the ﬁrm as a function of R&D and output subsidies:
π¯i(∆i,∆j , s1) = Π¯i(ψ¯
i
(∆i,∆j , s
1), ψ¯
j
(∆i,∆j , s
1),∆i, s1) (49)
= Rˆi(ψ¯
i
, ψ¯
j
)− Cˆi(ψ¯
i
, ψ¯
j
,∆i)− φi(∆i) + s1 · xi(ψ¯
i
, ψ¯
j
)
The ﬁrst order conditions for a Nash equilibrium in the choice of R&D are,
π¯1∆1(∆
1,∆2, s1) =
[
Rˆ12(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p2(p
1, p2,∆1) + s1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)]
ψ2∆1(∆
1,∆2, s1)−Cˆ1∆(p
1, p2,∆1)−φ11(∆
1) = 0
(50)
π¯2∆2(∆
1,∆2, s1) =
[
Rˆ21(p
1, p2)− Cˆ2p1(p
1, p2,∆2)
]
ψ1∆2(∆
2,∆1, s1)− Cˆ2∆(p
1, p2,∆2)− φ21(∆
2) = 0. (51)
With the second order conditions:16
π¯1∆1∆1 =
(
Rˆ12 − Cˆ
1
p2 + s
1
(
∂x2
∂p1
))
ψ¯
2
∆1∆1 + ψ¯
2
∆1

dRˆ12(p2, p1)
d∆1
−
dCˆ1
p2
(p2, p1,∆1)
d∆1
+ s1
d
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
d∆1


−Cˆ1p1∆ψ¯
1
∆1 − Cˆ
1
p2∆ψ¯
2
∆1 − Cˆ
1
∆∆ − φ
1
11 < 0 (52)
π¯2∆2∆2 =
(
Rˆ21 − Cˆ
2
p1
)
ψ¯
1
∆2∆2+ψ¯
1
∆2
(
dRˆ21(p
1, p2)
d∆2
−
dCˆ2p1(p
1, p2,∆2)
d∆2
)
−Cˆ2p2∆ψ¯
2
∆2−Cˆ
2
p1∆ψ¯
1
∆2−Cˆ
2
∆∆−φ
2
11 < 0
(53)
We assume that the own eﬀect of R&D on marginal proﬁts is stronger (bigger in absolute value) than
the cross eﬀect, that is, π¯i∆i∆i < π¯
i
∆i∆j . This implies that,
π¯1∆1∆1 π¯
2
∆2∆2 − π¯
1
∆1∆2 π¯
2
∆1∆2 > 0 (54)
The cross partial derivative π¯i∆i∆j is, in general, diﬃcult to sign. However, for the usual case of lin-
ear demand and constant marginal costs, the following proposition establishes that R&D expenditures are
strategic substitutes even if ﬁrms compete in prices.
Proposition 3 Under Bertrand competition, R&D expenditures are strategic substitutes for the case of linear
demand and constant marginal costs:
π¯i∆i∆j = ψ¯
j
∆i ψ¯
i
∆j Rˆ
i
ij(p
i, pj)− Cˆipi∆ψ¯
i
∆j − Cˆ
i
pj∆ψ¯
j
∆j < 0 (55)
15Expressions for ψ¯
1
s1 and ψ¯
2
s1 (in (47) and (48)) would be relevant if output subsidies are chosen after R&D levels are set.
16Notice that
dRˆij(p
i,pj)
d∆i
= Rˆiij(p
i, pj)ψ¯
i
∆i + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψ¯
j
∆i
< 0 (by (32), (33), (45) and (46)) and
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj ,∆i)
d∆i
=
Cˆi
pipj
(pi, pj,∆i)ψ¯
i
∆i + Cˆ
i
pjpj
(pi, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
j
∆i
+ Cˆi
pj∆
(pi, pj ,∆i). In general,
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj ,∆i)
d∆i
is hard to sign. However, in the case
of linear demand it is equal to Cˆi
pj∆
(pi, pj,∆i), which is negative. For the case of linear demand we also have that
d
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
d∆1
= 0.
Assuming also that marginal costs are constant with respect to output and linear with respect to R&D (i.e. ψ¯
j
∆i∆i
= 0), we
get π¯i
∆i∆i
(∆i,∆j, s1) = ψ¯
j
∆i
dRˆij(p
i,pj)
d∆i
− Cˆi
pi∆
ψ¯
i
∆i − 2Cˆ
i
pj∆
ψ¯
j
∆i
− Cˆi∆∆ − φ
i
ii. This expression can only be negative (for (52)
to hold) if 2Cˆi
pj∆
ψ¯
j
∆i
+ Cˆi∆∆ + φ
i
ii is big enough. This is equivalent to saying that as R&D increases, its cost-eﬀectiveness has
to decline fast enough, a condition similar to the Cournot case.
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Proof. See Appendix.
Proposition 3 states that an increase in R&D by ﬁrm 2 reduces the marginal proﬁtability of R&D by
ﬁrm 1. To see how this occurs, notice that ﬁrm 1 sets its R&D, ∆1, to satisfy (50). An inﬁnitesimal increase
in ∆1 has two opposing eﬀects on ﬁrm 1’s proﬁts. First, proﬁts increase due to the reduction in total costs
Cˆ1. On the other hand the decrease in p2 (due to increased R&D, ∆1) decreases ﬁrm revenues.17 The ﬁrst
order condition (50) shows this trade oﬀ against the increase in the cost of R&D , φ11(∆
1).
Consider now an inﬁnitesimal increase in R&D by ﬁrm 2. This reduces both p1 and p2. However, the fall
in own price (p2) is greater than the price decline for the rival.18 A bigger price increase for ﬁrm 1 means
that it now sells less. Lower output reduces the eﬀectiveness of ∆1 in reducing total costs for ﬁrm 1. This
is captured by the last two terms of (55). The ﬁrst term captures the eﬀect of an increase in ∆2 on the
marginal eﬀect of ∆1 on ﬁrm 1’s revenue. The fall in quantity (x1), associated with an increase in ∆2, makes
the revenue loss of an increase in ∆1 less important. This accounts for ψ¯
j
∆iψ¯
i
∆j Rˆ
i
ij(p
i, pj) being positive.
Note that the (direct) eﬀect on costs dominates the (indirect) eﬀect on revenue (as shown in the proof of
proposition 3). The positive eﬀect of investing in R&D for ﬁrm 1 weakens due to an increase in ∆2. Since
the marginal cost of R&D φ11(∆
1) is unaﬀected by a change in ∆2, an increase in foreign R&D (∆2) makes
own R&D less attractive. Therefore, ﬁrm 1 optimally invests less in R&D in response to an increase in ∆1,
implying that π¯i∆i∆j < 0.
A corollary of the previous proposition is that the slope of ﬁrm i’s R&D reaction function is negative.
Note that R&D reaction functions are negatively sloped (i.e. strategic substitutes) both under Cournot and
Bertrand competition because the main eﬀect of R&D comes through total costs. In both cases an increase
in R&D by ﬁrm 2 reduces ﬁrm 1’s output thereby decreasing the capacity of ∆1 to reduce ﬁrm 1’s total
costs. Under Cournot competition, the eﬀect on marginal revenue adds to this eﬀect on costs. With Bertrand
competition, the eﬀect on marginal revenue dampens (but does not dominate) the eﬀect on costs (as shown
in proposition 3).
The next section describes the eﬀect of output subsidies on R&D and price choices, under Bertrand
competition.
3.3 Output Subsidies
In order to see the eﬀect of output subsidies on R&D investment, we totally diﬀerentiate the two ﬁrst order
conditions given by (50) and (51). Unfortunately, no clear-cut solutions exist when we depart from the case
of linear demand and constant marginal costs. However, as this is the standard case analyzed in much of
the literature on the subject, we concentrate our analysis of output subsidies on this scenario.
The next proposition describes the eﬀect of an output subsidy on the equilibrium R&D chosen by ﬁrms.
Proposition 4 Under Bertrand competition, an output subsidy by the domestic government increases R&D
of the domestic firm, and reduces R&D of the foreign firm:
d∆1
ds1
> 0 (56)
d∆2
ds1
< 0. (57)
17From the envelope theorem we can ignore the eﬀect on ﬁrm 1’s price on its proﬁts.
18This can be easily seen comparing ψ¯
i
∆i
and ψ¯
i
∆j
on (45) and (46), and recalling that own eﬀects dominate cross eﬀects in
the price stage.
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Figure 2: Bertrand Competition: Eﬀect of an output subsidy s imposed by government 1.
Proof. See appendix
The intuition for this proposition is straightforward once we consider how R&D inﬂuences proﬁts. Recall
(from the discussion of proposition 3) that the incentives to invest in R&D decrease if output declines: the
beneﬁcial eﬀects of cost reduction are smaller if output is lower. Consider now an increase in the output
subsidy s1. The output subsidy results in a reduction in the price of both goods. However, p1 declines by a
greater amount than p2. As a result, output of ﬁrm 1 increases while output of ﬁrm 2 decreases. The output
expansion creates an even greater incentive for ﬁrm 1 to invest in R&D (shifts its R&D reaction function
out). The eﬀect on ﬁrm 2 is just the contrary: the incentives for ﬁrm 2 to invest in R&D decline (ﬁrm 2’s
R&D reaction function shifts in) due to the output subsidy, s1.
This is the same type of eﬀect as was observed under Cournot competition. An increase in the output
subsidy increases quantity produced thereby positively aﬀecting the incentives to invest in R&D for the home
ﬁrm. In both cases the foreign ﬁrm reduces its R&D due to decreased foreign production. As one would
expect, an output subsidy imposed by the domestic government aﬀects domestic R&D more than foreign
R&D. This result, formalized in the next corollary, is used later to determine the sign of the optimal output
subsidy.
Corollary 5 Under Bertrand competition, the eﬀect of an output subsidy on own R&D expenditures is
stronger than on foreign R&D expenditures: ∣∣∣∣d∆1ds1
∣∣∣∣ >
∣∣∣∣d∆2ds1
∣∣∣∣ (58)
Proof. See appendix
We can conduct a graphical analysis similar to the Cournot case. As with quantity competition, an
increase in output subsidy (s1) shifts the R&D reaction function of ﬁrm 1 out and that of ﬁrm 2 in (left
half of ﬁgure 2) This means that the equilibrium in R&D space moves from B (free trade) to S. For a small
output subsidy, this leaves ﬁrm 1 inside its isoproﬁt contour (π1) that passes through the free trade point
B : just looking at the R&D stage an output subsidy increases welfare for the domestic country. However,
as in the Cournot case, we have to also take into account the eﬀect of the subsidy in the price competition
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stage. This is illustrated in the right half of ﬁgure 2. As in the case of Cournot competition, an output
subsidy increases domestic and reduces foreign R&D, reducing domestic marginal costs beyond the direct
eﬀect of the subsidy and increasing foreign marginal costs. This means that the domestic price reaction
function shifts in and the foreign price reaction function shifts out, moving the equilibrium from B to S.
From corollary 5 we know that even if we only take into account the eﬀect of R&D on the price stage, the
reaction function of ﬁrm 1 will shift more that the reaction function of ﬁrm 2. This leaves point S outside
the isoproﬁt contour π1 passing through point B in the price space. Therefore an output subsidy reduces
welfare for the home government in the price stage. The net eﬀect on the two stages determines whether an
output subsidy increases or reduces welfare.
Formally, deﬁne the net domestic beneﬁt of government 1 as B¯1(s1) = π¯1(∆1,∆2, s1) − s1x1(ψ¯
1
, ψ¯
2
).
Taking the derivative of B¯1(s1) with respect to s1:
∂B¯1
∂s1
= π¯1∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ π¯1∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ π¯1s1 − x
1
− s1
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
− s1
∂x1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
(59)
which can be rewritten as (see appendix):
∂B¯1
∂s1
=m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
s1 − s
1
[
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+
∂x1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
]
(60)
where m1 ≡ p1− ∂C
1
∂x1
+ s1 > 0 is the gross beneﬁt per unit sold, including the output subsidy. Note that the
terms dψ¯
i
ds1
capture the total eﬀect of the output subsidy on prices. They take into account that the subsidy
also aﬀects the choice of R&D by both ﬁrms in the second stage (and these, in turn, aﬀect prices).
The ﬁrst term on the right hand side of (60) shows the eﬀect of the output subsidy on domestic beneﬁt in
the second stage (R&D investment). A domestic output subsidy reduces foreign R&D investment
(
d∆2
ds1
< 0
)
,
which in turn increases the foreign price p2. The increase in p2 increases domestic output x1 and hence ﬁrm
1’s proﬁts. Notice that due to the envelope theorem, the eﬀect of an inﬁnitesimal increase in the subsidy s1
on domestic beneﬁt B¯1 (through domestic R&D) can be ignored.
The second term in (60) captures the eﬀect of an output subsidy on domestic beneﬁt in the third stage
(price competition stage). A domestic output subsidy reduces the foreign price in the price competition stage
(ψ¯
2
s1 < 0). The reduction in the foreign price p
2 reduces domestic output and proﬁts. Again the envelope
theorem allows us to ignore the eﬀect of the output subsidy on domestic beneﬁts through the domestic price
p1.
Notice that, starting from a subsidy s1 equal to zero, an inﬁnitesimal increase in the subsidy increases
domestic beneﬁts if and only if the R&D stage eﬀect
(
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
)
is stronger than the price stage eﬀect,(
ψ¯
2
s1
)
.
∂B¯1
∂s1
∣∣∣∣
s1=0
=
[
p1 −
∂C1
∂x1
](
∂x1
∂p2
)(
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1
)
(61)
The third term in (60) captures the increase in the subsidy bill brought about by an increase in domestic
output. It includes the direct eﬀect of the subsidy in the price competition stage as well as the R&D stage
eﬀect and price stage eﬀect. To obtain the expression for the optimal output subsidy we need to solve
∂B¯1
∂s1
= 0 (62)
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with the second order condition
∂2B¯1
(∂s1)2
< 0. (63)
Solving (62), the precise expression for the optimal output subsidy is obtained:
s1∗ = m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+ ∂x
1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
(64)
where m1 = p1− ∂C
1
∂x1
+s1∗ as before. The denominator in (64) is positive,19 and thus the sign of the optimal
subsidy depends on whether the eﬀect on the R&D stage or on the price stage dominates in the numerator of
(64). Deﬁne θ = −
Cˆi
pi∆
∂xi
∂pi
= −∂
2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi as the eﬀectiveness of R&D at reducing marginal costs of production.
As we will see, the sign of the optimal output subsidy is ambiguous and depends on the cost of R&D (φ111)
relative to the eﬀectiveness of R&D (θ). Notice from (45) that ψ¯
i
∆i is independent of φ
1
11. Therefore,
d∆2
ds1
is
the only term in the numerator of (64) that depends on φ111. The following lemma helps to understand the
role of the cost of R&D on the elasticity of R&D to output subsidies.
Lemma 6 The inﬂuence of output subsidies on R&D decreases as the marginal cost of R&D increases.
Speciﬁcally,
∂
∣∣∣ d∆1
ds1
∣∣∣
∂φ111
< 0 (65)
∂
∣∣∣ d∆2
ds1
∣∣∣
∂φ111
< 0. (66)
Proof. See Appendix
An increase in φ111 makes R&D investment more convex. As a result, R&D is less elastic to an output
subsidy, and therefore the R&D stage eﬀect of an output subsidy in (64) is weaker. Whenever the R&D
stage eﬀect is weak, the optimal output subsidy is inﬂuenced more by the price stage eﬀect and should be
optimally set below zero (an output tax).
The domestic government only takes into account the eﬀect of an output subsidy on price competition
when the eﬀect of an output subsidy on foreign R&D is smaller (φ111 becomes higher). Contrarily, the
government only takes into account the eﬀect of the output subsidy on the R&D stage when φ111 is small
enough. The following proposition formalizes this result, showing that we could have an output subsidy or
a tax depending on the convexity of the cost of investment in R&D, i.e. φi11.
20
Proposition 7 Under Bertrand competition, the optimal output subsidy s1∗ can be positive or negative,
depending on the convexity of the cost of R&D (φi11). The optimal output subsidy is positive (an output
subsidy) when the cost of additional investment in R&D is suﬃciently low (low φi11), and negative (an
output tax) when φi11 is suﬃciently high. Speciﬁcally,
∃φ¯ <∞ such that if φi11 > φ¯ then s
1∗ < 0
∃φ > θπ¯1∆1s1 − π
i
∆i∆j such that if φ
i
11 < φ then s
1∗ > 0.
19See the proof of proposition 7.
20Notice, however, that φi
11
is bounded below by the stability condition (54) and therefore cannot take values below θπ¯1
∆1s1
−
πi
∆i∆j
. See the proof of lemma 6.
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Figure 3: Cournot: Optimal output subsidy
(
s1∗
)
as a function of the cost-eﬀectiveness of R&D
(
η = θ
2
bφ
)
.
(for a− c = 1, γ = 0.5)
Proof. See Appendix
As φi11 increases, the cost of investing in R&D becomes more convex. A steeper R&D cost function makes
R&D less elastic with respect to an output subsidy. This reduces the eﬀect of the subsidy on the foreign
ﬁrm’s R&D reaction function, leaving the eﬀect on the foreign ﬁrm price reaction function unaﬀected. This
implies that the domestic government has an incentive to reduce the output subsidy, or even tax output, as
in the standard Bertrand game without R&D investment.
The following section performs a numerical exercise to highlight the results of price and quantity com-
petition.
4 A Numerical Example
In this example,21 we consider linear demands and constant marginal costs with respect to output. In
particular, assume that the inverse demand for good i is given by:
pi = a− b(xi + γxj). (67)
With 0 < γ < 1. Cost functions are linear in output,
C(xi,∆i) =
(
c− θ∆i
)
xi (68)
and the monetary cost of ∆i units of R&D is quadratic:
φ(∆i) = φ
(
∆i
)2
2
. (69)
The optimal output subsidy is always positive under Cournot competition, as both the R&D stage eﬀect
(q¯2∆2
d∆2
ds1
) and the price stage eﬀect (q¯2s1) have the same sign (see proposition 2). R&D becomes more elastic
with respect to the output subsidy as the cost of R&D becomes ﬂatter (i.e. φi11 falls). In this case the
government has greater incentives to subsidize output thereby reducing foreign R&D. Figure 3 shows the
optimal subsidy as a function of the cost-eﬀectiveness of R&D (deﬁned as η = θ
2
φb
). The optimal subsidy is
increasing in η.
21The mathematica code used to generate the numerical results is available from the authors upon request.
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Cournot Competition: numerical simulation
Product diﬀerentiation γ 0.5 0.5
Cost-eﬀectiveness of R&D η = θ
2
φb
0.3 0.7
Price ﬁrm 1 p1 0.2765a+ 0.7235c 0.0689a+ 0.9311c
Price ﬁrm 2 p2 0.3035a+ 0.6965c 0.1349a+ 0.8651c
Output ﬁrm 1 x1 0.5004
(
a−c
b
)
0.6648
(
a−c
b
)
Output ﬁrm 2 x2 0.4463
(
a−c
b
)
0.5328
(
a−c
b
)
R&D ﬁrm 1 ∆1 0.1601
(
a−c
θ
)
0.4964
(
a−c
θ
)
R&D ﬁrm 2 ∆2 0.1428
(
a−c
θ
)
0.3977
(
a−c
θ
)
Unit proﬁt ﬁrm 1 m1 = p1 − c+ s1 0.3403 (a− c) 0.1684 (a− c)
Unit proﬁt ﬁrm 2 m2 = p2 − c 0.3035 (a− c) 0.1349 (a− c)
Total proﬁts ﬁrm 1 π1 0.2076 (a−c)
2
b
0.2659 (a−c)
2
b
Total proﬁts ﬁrm 2 π2 0.1652 (a−c)
2
b
0.1707 (a−c)
2
b
Beneﬁts country 1 B1 0.1757 (a−c)
2
b
0.1998 (a−c)
2
b
Beneﬁts country 2 B2 0.1652 (a−c)
2
b
0.1707 (a−c)
2
b
Optimal output subsidy s1∗ 0.0638 (a− c) 0.0995 (a− c)
Government’s SOC ∂
2B1
(∂s1∗)2
−
0.5987
b
−
0.8141
b
Table 1: Numerical simulation under Cournot Competition in the third stage
The case of Bertrand competition is slightly more complicated. We have to satisfy (63), the second order
condition of the government maximization problem. As we expected, the optimal subsidy also depends on
the cost—eﬀectiveness of R&D (η). Figure 4 shows the optimal output subsidy, which is increasing in η
(decreasing in φi11). Note that as the R&D eﬀect becomes stronger (η increases) the government reverses its
policy from an output tax to an output subsidy.22 Note also that, interestingly, there is a set of parameter
values for which free trade (s1∗ = 0) is an equilibrium in the Bertrand case, even in the presence of imperfect
competition.
Tables 1 and 2 present numerical results for γ = 0.3 and two diﬀerent values of η (0.3 and 0.7). Notice that
all relevant quantities are positive and that the second order condition for the government’s maximization
problem is satisﬁed. Table 2 shows that, depending on the cost-eﬀectiveness of R&D (η), there could be a
policy reversal under Bertrand competition.23
22For the Bertrand example in this section, (ﬁgure 4), the stability condition (54) translates into
η <
(
1− γ2
)
(4− γ2)2
2 (2− γ2) (2 + γ − γ2)
For the value in the numerical example (γ = 0.5), we require η < 1.33929 to satisfy that condition.
23The numerical simulations presented in section 3 of Neary and Leahy (2000) assume, for the Cournot case, a set of
parameters, which with our notation, imply b = γ = θ = a − c = 1 and η = 1
φ
= 0.2. For that set of parameters we obtain
an optimal subsidy s1∗ = 0.3089, which roughly corresponds to what they refer to as the second—best optimal output subsidy.
This is represented by the intersection of the ﬂatter line with the vertical axis in their ﬁgure 3.
For the Bertrand simulation, they use a set of parameters b = θ = a− c = 1 and η = 1
φ
= 0.4, with inverse demands
xi = a− b(pi − pj)
which means that cross price eﬀects are as strong as own price eﬀects. Therefore we cannot compare directly with their
results. They ﬁnd that the optimal output subsidy is negative (point C in their ﬁgure 4). If we set γ = 0.5 with their other
parameters, in our simulation we obtain a negative output subsidy (i.e. a tax) equal to s1∗ = −0.0224. We only need to have a
cost—eﬀectiveness of R&D beyond 0.6 to obtain a positive output subsidy, as shown in ﬁgure 4.
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Figure 4: Bertrand: Optimal output subsidy
(
s1∗
)
as a function of the cost-eﬀectiveness of R&D
(
η = θ
2
bφ
)
.
(for a− c = 1, γ = 0.5)
Bertrand Competition: numerical simulations
Product diﬀerentiation γ 0.5 0.5
Cost-eﬀectiveness of R&D η = θ
2
φb
0.3 0.7
Price ﬁrm 1 p1 0.2575a+ 0.7425c 0.0483a+ 0.9517c
Price ﬁrm 2 p2 0.2422a+ 0.7578c 0.0598a+ 0.9401c
Output ﬁrm 1 x1 0.4848
(
a−c
b
)
0.6422
(
a−c
b
)
Output ﬁrm 2 x2 0.5154
(
a−c
b
)
0.6191
(
a−c
b
)
R&D ﬁrm 1 ∆1 0.1357
(
a−c
θ
)
0.4196
(
a−c
θ
)
R&D ﬁrm 2 ∆2 0.1443
(
a−c
θ
)
0.4044
(
a−c
θ
)
Unit proﬁt ﬁrm 1 m1 = p1 − c+ s1 0.2278 (a− c) 0.0621 (a− c)
Unit proﬁt ﬁrm 2 m2 = p2 − c 0.2422 (a− c) 0.0598 (a− c)
Total proﬁts ﬁrm 1 π1 0.1455 (a−c)
2
b
0.1836 (a−c)
2
b
Total proﬁts ﬁrm 2 π2 0.1645 (a−c)
2
b
0.1706 (a−c)
2
b
Beneﬁts country 1 B1 0.1599 (a−c)
2
b
0.1747 (a−c)
2
b
Beneﬁts country 2 B2 0.1645 (a−c)
2
b
0.1706 (a−c)
2
b
Optimal output subsidy s1∗ −0.0297 (a− c) 0.0138 (a− c)
Government’s SOC ∂
2B1
(∂s1∗)2
−
0.8055
b
−
1.1226
b
Table 2: Numerical simulation under Bertrand Competition in the third stage
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5 Conclusions
This paper shows that for suﬃciently cost eﬀective R&D the trade policy reversal in Eaton and Grossman
(1986) is not observed. Our result suggests that output subsidies are more robust than otherwise implied by
the literature on strategic trade. If exporting industries make long run investments before competing in the
market then governments have a case for using output subsidies even if they are uncertain about the mode
of competition in the market.
We show that a necessary condition for output subsidies to be robust is that R&D be suﬃciently cost
eﬀective. If the cost of R&D is too convex then R&D expenditures will be relatively inelastic to the export
subsidy. In this case, the eﬀect of an export subsidy on R&Dwill be negligible and will thus be arbitrarily close
to the case when there is no R&D investment (Brander and Spencer (1985), Eaton and Grossman (1986)).
If R&D costs are not too convex then R&D is responsive to an output subsidy. In this case, the eﬀect of
the output subsidy on the R&D stage reinforces the eﬀect of the output subsidy on the market competition
stage under Cournot competition, and dominates it under Bertrand competition. Thus, regardless of the
mode of competition, the optimal policy is an output subsidy if R&D is suﬃciently cost-eﬀective.
Our condition on the curvature of the cost of R&D is reminiscent of Maggi (1996). In his model, ﬁrms
invest in capacity and then compete in prices in the product market. Maggi shows that going from Cournot
to Bertrand competition the optimal policy changes from an output subsidy to a tax. The key parameter
is his model is the convexity of the cost function. A more convex cost function (i.e. steeper marginal cost)
results in ﬁrm behavior closer to price competition. The optimal trade policy in this case is an output tax.
Contrarily, a ﬂatter marginal cost implies that the optimal policy is an output subsidy. In contrast to Maggi
(1996), in our model marginal costs are constant. Under Bertrand competition, whether the optimal policy
is an output subsidy or a tax, depends on the convexity of the cost of R&D . Under Cournot competition,
the optimal trade policy is always an output subsidy.
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Appendix
A Proof of Proposition 1
Diﬀerentiate totally the two ﬁrst order conditions given by (18) to get:
d∆i
ds1
=
−π¯
j
∆j∆j π¯
i
∆is1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
j
∆js1
π¯i∆i∆i π¯
j
∆j∆j − π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
j
∆i∆j
(70)
In order to obtain the value of the expressions in (70) we ﬁrst need to sign the total eﬀect of subsidies
on marginal revenues (including the eﬀect on the last stage (quantity competition). We therefore have
dR12(x
1, x2)
ds1
= R112(x
1, x2)q¯1s1 +R
1
22(x
1, x2)q¯2s1 < 0 (71)
dR21(x
1, x2)
ds1
= R211(x
1, x2)q¯1s1 +R
2
12(x
1, x2)q¯2s1 > 0 (72)
by (5), (6), (16) and (17). Using these signs we can now turn to the elements in (70)
π¯i∆i∆i = R
i
j q¯
j
∆i∆i + q¯
j
∆i
dRij(x
i, xj)
d∆i
− Cix∆q¯
i
∆i − C
i
∆∆ − φ
i
ii < 0 (73)
π¯i∆i∆j = R
i
j q¯
j
∆i∆j + q¯
j
∆i
dRij(x
i, xj)
d∆j
− Cix∆q¯
i
∆j < 0 (74)
π¯1∆1s1 = R
1
2q¯
2
∆1s1 + q¯
2
∆1
dR12(x
1, x2)
ds1
− C1x∆q¯
1
s1 > 0 (75)
π¯2∆2s1 = R
2
1q¯
1
∆2s1 + q¯
1
∆2
dR21(x
1, x2)
ds1
− C2x∆q¯
2
s1 < 0 (76)
where the ﬁrst inequality is the second order condition of the maximization in the R&D stage, the second
inequality repeats (21), and the last two inequalities are derived from (71), (72), (16), (17), (15) and noting
that for linear demand and constant marginal costs, q¯i∆j is independent of s
1. Therefore
d∆1
ds1
=
−π¯2∆2∆2 π¯
1
∆1s1 + π¯
1
∆1∆2 π¯
2
∆2s1
π¯1∆1∆1π¯
2
∆2∆2 − π¯
1
∆1∆2 π¯
2
∆1∆2
> 0 (77)
d∆2
ds1
=
−π¯1∆1∆1 π¯
2
∆2s1 + π¯
2
∆2∆1 π¯
1
∆1s1
π¯2∆2∆2π¯
1
∆1∆1 − π¯
2
∆2∆1 π¯
1
∆2∆1
< 0 (78)
B Proof of Proposition 3.
Note that,
π¯1∆1∆2 =
(
Rˆ12 − Cˆ
1
p2 + s
1
(
∂x1
∂p2
))
ψ¯
2
∆1∆2 + ψ¯
2
∆1

dRˆ12(p1, p2)
d∆2
−
dCˆ1p2(p
1, p2,∆1)
d∆2
+ s1
d
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
d∆2


−Cˆ1p1∆ψ¯
1
∆2 − Cˆ
1
p2∆ψ¯
2
∆2 (79)
π¯2∆2∆1 =
(
Rˆ21 − Cˆ
2
p1
)
ψ¯
1
∆2∆1 + ψ¯
1
∆2
(
dRˆ21(p
1, p2)
d∆1
−
dCˆ2p1(p
1, p2,∆2)
d∆1
)
− Cˆ2p2∆ψ¯
2
∆1 − Cˆ
2
p1∆ψ¯
1
∆1 (80)
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Here,
dRˆij(p
i,pj)
d∆j = Rˆ
i
ij(p
i, pj)ψ¯
i
∆j+Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψ¯
j
∆j < 0 (from (32), (33), (45) and (46)) and
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj,∆i)
d∆j =
Cˆi
pipj
(pi, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
i
∆j + Cˆ
i
pjpj
(pi, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
j
∆j . Both the second order condition (52) and the stability condition
(54) impose bounds on φiii (this is discussed in the determination of the optimal subsidy).
Note that, under the assumption that marginal costs are constant, we have ψ¯
j
∆i∆j = 0. If demand is
linear then Rˆijj = 0 and the slope of the demand function is not inﬂuenced by R&D. Formally:
d
(
∂xi
∂pi
)
d∆j
=
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂ (pi)
2 ψ¯
i
∆j +
∂2xi(pi, pj)
∂pi∂pj
ψ¯
j
∆j = 0 (81)
Both linearity of demand and constant marginal costs together imply Cˆipipj = Cˆ
i
pjpj =
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj,∆i)
d∆j = 0.
Then, we can simplify both expressions π¯i∆i∆j to:
π¯i∆i∆j = ψ¯
j
∆iψ¯
i
∆j Rˆ
i
ij(p
i, pj)− Cˆipi∆ψ¯
i
∆j − Cˆ
i
pj∆ψ¯
j
∆j
=
−Π¯jijCˆ
i
pi∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
−Π¯iijCˆ
j
pj∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
Rˆiij − Cˆ
i
pi∆
−Π¯iijCˆ
j
pj∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
− Cˆipj∆
Π¯iiiCˆ
j
pj∆
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
=
Π¯jijCˆ
i
pi∆Π¯
i
ijCˆ
j
pj∆Rˆ
i
ij + Cˆ
i
pi∆Π¯
i
ijCˆ
j
pj∆
(
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
)
− Cˆi
pj∆Π
i
iiCˆ
j
pj∆
(
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
)
(
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
)2 (82)
Recall that, for linear demands, Π¯iij = Rˆ
i
ij . Notice also that in the case of linear demands, Π¯
i is quadratic
and all second derivatives of Π¯i(p1, p2) with respect to prices are thus constant. Therefore, Π¯iii = Π¯
j
jj and
Π¯jij = Π¯
i
ij . If we also have constant marginal costs, all second derivatives of Cˆ
i(p1, p2,∆i) are constant.
Therefore Cˆipi∆ = Cˆ
j
pj∆. Remember also that
∣∣Π¯iii∣∣ > ∣∣Π¯iij∣∣, ∣∣∣Cˆipi∆∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣Cˆipj∆∣∣∣ and ∣∣∣∂xi∂pi ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∂xi∂pj ∣∣∣ . All this
implies that
π¯i∆i∆j =
(
Π¯iij
)3 (
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
+
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
Π¯iij
(
Π¯iii
)2
−
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2 (
Π¯iij
)3
− Cˆi
pj∆
(
Π¯iii
)3
Cˆi
pi∆ + Cˆ
i
pj∆Π¯
i
iiCˆ
i
pi∆
(
Π¯iij
)2
((
Π¯iii
)2
−
(
Π¯iij
)2)2
=
(
Cˆipi∆
)2
Π¯iij
(
Π¯iii
)2
− Cˆipj∆
(
Π¯iii
)3
Cˆipi∆ + Cˆ
i
pj∆Π¯
i
iiCˆ
i
pi∆
(
Π¯iij
)2
((
Π¯iii
)2
−
(
Π¯iij
)2)2
=
(
Cˆipi∆
)2 (
Π¯iii
)3
((
Π¯iii
)2
−
(
Π¯iij
)2)2

Π¯iij
Π¯iii
−
Cˆipj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
+
Cˆipj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Π¯iij
Π¯iii
)2
=
(
Cˆipi∆
)2 (
Π¯iii
)3
((
Π¯iii
)2
−
(
Π¯iij
)2)2

1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
−
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
+
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
(
1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
)2 =
(
Cˆipi∆
)2 (
Π¯iii
)3
((
Π¯iii
)2
−
(
Π¯iij
)2)2
[
1
2
γ −
1
4
γ3
]
< 0 (83)
since γ = −
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
is between zero and one and Π¯iii < 0. Notice that γ measures the degree of product
diﬀerentiation and is bounded between 0 (independent goods) and 1 (perfect substitutes).
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C Proof of Proposition 4
For later use we need to compute ψ¯
i
∆i∆j and ψ¯
i
∆j∆j . Diﬀerentiating (46) we obtain
ψ¯
i
∆i∆j =
Π¯iijCˆ
j
pj∆Cˆ
i
pipi∆Π¯
j
jj(
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
j
ijΠ¯
i
ij
)2 (84)
ψ¯
i
∆j∆j =
(
−RˆiijCˆ
j
pj∆∆
)(
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
i
ijΠ¯
j
ij
)
+ Π¯iijCˆ
j
pj∆Cˆ
j
pjpj∆Π¯
i
ii(
Π¯iiiΠ¯
j
jj − Π¯
i
ijΠ¯
j
ij
)2 (85)
Note that ψ¯
i
∆i∆j is zero for constant marginal costs with respect to output and ψ¯
i
∆j∆j is zero for marginal
costs that are constant with respect to output and linear with respect to R&D.
For the ﬁrst part of the proof, we will follow similar steps as the proof of proposition 1. We start by
diﬀerentiating totally the two ﬁrst order conditions given by (50) and (51). Using Cramer’s rule:
d∆i
ds1
=
−π¯
j
∆j∆j π¯
i
∆is1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
j
∆js1
π¯i∆i∆i π¯
j
∆j∆j − π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
j
∆i∆j
(86)
To obtain the value of expressions in (70) we need to obtain the total eﬀect of subsidies on marginal revenues
(including the eﬀect on the last (price competition) stage). We have
dRˆij(p
i, pj)
d∆i
= Rˆiij(p
i, pj)ψ¯
i
∆i + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψ¯
j
∆i < 0 (87)
dRˆij(p
i, pj)
d∆j
= Rˆiij(p
i, pj)ψ¯
i
∆j + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψ¯
j
∆j < 0 (88)
dRˆij(p
i, pj)
ds1
= Rˆiij(p
i, pj)ψ¯
i
s1 + Rˆ
i
jj(p
i, pj)ψ¯
j
s1 < 0 (89)
where the inequalities are obtained from (32), (33), (45), (46), (47) and (48).
Turn next to the total eﬀect of R&D on marginal costs:
dCˆipj (p
i, pj ,∆i)
d∆i
= Cˆipipj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
i
∆i + Cˆ
i
pjpj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
j
∆i + Cˆ
i
pj∆(p
i, pj ,∆i) < 0 (90)
dCˆipj (p
i, pj ,∆i)
d∆j
= Cˆipipj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
i
∆j + Cˆ
i
pjpj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
j
∆j = 0 (91)
dCˆi
pj
(pi, pj ,∆i)
ds1
= Cˆipipj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
i
s1 + Cˆ
i
pjpj (p
i, pj ,∆i)ψ¯
j
s1 = 0 (92)
where the inequalities are derived from (34), (35), (45), (46), (47) and (48). We also assume linear demand
and constant marginal cost with respect to output (so that Cˆi
pjpj
= Cˆi
pipj
= 0). Finally, note that for linear
demands, the slope of the demand function is not inﬂuenced by R&D (equation 81)
Using these inequalities we can now turn to the elements of (86). We will use the fact that, for lin-
ear demands, Π¯iij = Rˆ
i
ij and both are quadratic with constant second derivatives with respect to prices.
Therefore, Π¯iii = Π¯
j
jj and Π¯
j
ij = Π¯
i
ij . If we also have constant marginal costs, all second derivatives of
Cˆi(p1, p2,∆i) are constant. Therefore Cˆipi∆ = Cˆ
j
pj∆. For linear demand and constant marginal costs we have
ψ¯
i
∆j∆j = ψ¯
i
∆i∆j =
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj,∆i)
d∆j =
dCˆi
pj
(pi,pj,∆i)
ds1
=
d
(
∂xi
∂pi
)
d∆j = Cˆ
i
∆∆ = 0. Remember also that
∣∣Π¯iii∣∣ > ∣∣Π¯iij∣∣,∣∣∣∂xi∂pi ∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣∂xi∂pj ∣∣∣, and that assumption (30) means ∣∣∣Cˆipi∆∣∣∣ > ∣∣∣Cˆipj∆∣∣∣. All these imply that
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π¯1∆1∆1 =
(
Rˆ12 − Cˆ
1
p2 + s
1
(
∂x2
∂p1
))
ψ¯
2
∆1∆1 + ψ¯
2
∆1

dRˆ12(p2, p1)
d∆1
−
dCˆ1p2(p
2, p1,∆1)
d∆1
+ s1
d
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
d∆1


−Cˆ1p1∆ψ¯
1
∆1 − Cˆ
1
p2∆ψ¯
2
∆1 − Cˆ
1
∆∆ − φ
1
11
= ψ¯
2
∆1
(
Rˆ112ψ¯
1
∆1 − Cˆ
1
p2∆
)
− Cˆ1p1∆ψ¯
1
∆1 − Cˆ
1
p2∆ψ¯
2
∆1 − φ
1
11
=
−Π221Cˆ
1
p1∆
Π222Π
1
11 −Π
1
21Π
2
21
(
Rˆ112Π
2
22Cˆ
1
p1∆
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
− Cˆ1p2∆
)
− Cˆ1p1∆
Π222Cˆ
1
p1∆
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
− Cˆ1p2∆
−Π221Cˆ
1
p1∆
Π222Π
1
11 −Π
1
21Π
2
21
− φ111
=
−ΠiijCˆ
i
pi∆(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2
(
Πiij
ΠiiiCˆ
i
pi∆(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2 − Cˆipj∆
)
− Cˆipi∆
ΠiiiCˆ
i
pi∆(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2 − Cˆipj∆ −Π
i
ijCˆ
i
pi∆(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2 − φ111
=
(
Πiii
)3 (
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2

Πiij
Πiii
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
−
(
Πiij
Πiii
)3
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
− 1 +
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
Πiij
Πiii
−
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiij
Πiii
)3− φ111
=
(
Πiii
)3 (
Cˆi
pi∆
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2

(1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
)
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
−
(
1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
)3
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
− 1 +
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
(
1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
)
−
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
(
1
2
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
)3− φ111
=
(
Πiii
)3 (
Cˆipi∆
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
1
2
γ2 −
1
8
γ4 − 1 +
1
2
γ2 −
1
8
γ4
]
− φ111
=
(
Πiii
)3 (
Cˆipi∆
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
γ2 −
1
4
γ4 − 1
]
− φ111 (93)
where γ = −
∂xi
∂pj
∂xi
∂pi
measures the degree of product diﬀerentiation as in the proof of proposition 3.
π¯2∆2∆2 =
(
Rˆ21 − Cˆ
2
p1
)
ψ¯
1
∆2∆2 + ψ¯
1
∆2
(
dRˆ21(p
1, p2)
d∆2
−
dCˆ2p1(p
1, p2,∆2)
d∆2
)
− Cˆ2p2∆ψ¯
2
∆2 − Cˆ
2
p1∆ψ¯
1
∆2 − Cˆ
2
∆∆ − φ
2
11
= ψ¯
1
∆2
(
Rˆ212ψ¯
2
∆2 − Cˆ
2
p1∆
)
− Cˆ2p2∆ψ¯
2
∆2 − Cˆ
2
p1∆ψ¯
1
∆2 − φ
2
11
= π¯1∆1∆1 (94)
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π¯1∆1s1 =
(
Rˆ12 − Cˆ
1
p2 + s
1
(
∂x1
∂p2
))
ψ¯
2
∆1s1 + ψ¯
2
∆1
(
dRˆ12(p
1, p2)
ds1
−
dCˆ1p2(p
1, p2,∆1)
ds1
+
(
∂x1
∂p2
))
−Cˆ1p1∆ψ¯
1
s1 − Cˆ
1
p2∆ψ¯
2
s1
= ψ¯
2
∆1
(
Rˆ112ψ¯
1
s1 +
(
∂x1
∂p2
))
− Cˆ1p1∆ψ¯
1
s1 − Cˆ
1
p2∆ψ¯
2
s1
=
−Π221Cˆ
1
p1∆
Π222Π
1
11 −Π
1
21Π
2
21

− Rˆ112Π222
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
+
(
∂x1
∂p2
)+ Cˆ1p1∆ Π
2
22
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
− Cˆ1p2∆
Π212
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
=
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Cˆipi∆
(
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2

−Πiij
Πiii
∂x1
∂p2
∂x1
∂p1
+
∂x1
∂p2
∂x1
∂p1
(
Πiij
Πiii
)3
+ 1−
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
Πiij
Πiii
+
Cˆi
pj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiij
Πiii
)3
=
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
−
1
2
γ2 +
1
8
γ4 + 1−
1
2
γ2 +
1
8
γ4
]
=
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
−γ2 +
1
4
γ4 + 1
]
> 0 (95)
π¯2∆2s1 =
(
Rˆ21 − Cˆ
2
p1
)
ψ¯
1
∆2s1 + ψ¯
1
∆2
(
dRˆ21(p
1, p2)
ds1
−
dCˆ2p1(p
1, p2,∆2)
ds1
)
− Cˆ2p2∆ψ¯
2
s1 − Cˆ
2
p1∆ψ¯
1
s1
= ψ¯
1
∆2Rˆ
2
21(p
1, p2)ψ¯
2
s1 − Cˆ
2
p2∆ψ¯
2
s1 − Cˆ
2
p1∆ψ¯
1
s1
=
−Π112Cˆ
2
p2∆
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12

Rˆ221 Π
2
12
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12

− Cˆ2p2∆ Π
2
12
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
− Cˆ2p1∆
−Π222
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Π111Π
2
22 −Π
2
12Π
1
12
=
−ΠiijCˆ
i
pi∆(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2


(
Πiij
)2 (∂x1
∂p1
)
(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2

− Cˆipi∆ Π
i
ij
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2 − Cˆipj∆ −Π
i
ii
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
(
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2
=
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
−
(
Πiij
)3
Cˆi
pi∆ − Cˆ
i
pi∆Π
i
ij
(
Πiii
)2
+ Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiij
)3
+ Cˆi
pj∆
(
Πiii
)3
− Cˆi
pj∆Π
i
ii
(
Πiij
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
=
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2

−Πiij
Πiii
+
Cˆipj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
−
Cˆipj∆
Cˆi
pi∆
(
Πiij
Πiii
)2
=
(
∂x1
∂p1
)
Cˆipi∆
(
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
−
1
2
γ +
1
4
γ3
]
< 0 (96)
The second order condition (52) means that π¯i∆i∆i < 0, whereas the stability condition (54) implies that(
π¯i∆i∆i
)2
>
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2
. Also, from proposition 3:
π¯1∆1∆2 = π¯
2
∆2∆1 =
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)2 (
Πiii
)3
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
1
2
γ −
1
4
γ3
]
< 0 (97)
All these imply:
d∆1
ds1
=
−π¯i∆i∆i π¯
1
∆1s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
2
∆2s1(
π¯i∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2 > 0 (98)
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and
d∆2
ds1
=
−π¯i∆i∆i π¯
2
∆2s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
1
∆1s1(
π¯i∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2 < 0 (99)
Which is the statement of the proposition.
From (93), (97), (95) and (96) we can also derive the following relationships, to be used later:
π¯1∆1s1
(
−
Cˆipi∆
∂x1
∂p1
)
− φ111 = θπ¯
1
∆1s1 − φ
1
11 = π¯
i
∆i∆i (100)
π¯2∆2s1
(
−
Cˆipi∆
∂x1
∂p1
)
= θπ¯2∆2s1 = π¯
i
∆i∆j (101)
π¯1∆1s1
π¯i∆i∆j
=
1
θ
[
γ2 − 14γ
4
− 1
][
1
2γ −
1
4γ
3
] (102)
π¯2∆2s1θ
[
γ2 − 14γ
4
− 1
][
1
2γ −
1
4γ
3
] − φ111 = π¯i∆i∆i (103)
D Proof of Corollary 5
Note, ﬁrst, that from (95) and (96),
∣∣π¯1∆1s1∣∣ > ∣∣π¯2∆2s1∣∣ for γ between 0 and 1. Also, from (98) and (99):
∣∣∣∣d∆1ds1
∣∣∣∣−
∣∣∣∣d∆2ds1
∣∣∣∣ = d∆1ds1 + d∆
2
ds1
=
−π¯i∆i∆i π¯
1
∆1s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
2
∆2s1(
π¯i∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2 + −π¯i∆i∆i π¯2∆2s1 + π¯i∆i∆j π¯1∆1s1(
π¯i∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2
=
−π¯i∆i∆i
(
π¯1∆1s1 + π¯
2
∆2s1
)
+ π¯i∆i∆j
(
π¯1∆1s1 + π¯
2
∆2s1
)
(
π¯i∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2
=
−
(
π¯i∆i∆i − π¯
i
∆i∆j
) (
π¯1∆1s1 + π¯
2
∆2s1
)
(
π¯i∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2
= −
π¯1∆1s1 + π¯
2
∆2s1
π¯i∆i∆i + π¯
i
∆i∆j
> 0 (104)
where the inequality comes from the denominator being negative ((52) and proposition 3), π¯1∆1s1 > 0 by
(95) and
∣∣π¯1∆1s1∣∣ > ∣∣π¯2∆2s1∣∣.
E Derivation of equation (60)
Recall that from the ﬁrst order condition in the R&D stage, π¯1∆1 = 0, and also,
π¯1s1 =
[
Rˆ12(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p2(p
1, p2,∆) + s1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)]
ψ¯
2
s1(∆
1,∆2, s1) + x1 =m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
s1 + x
1 (105)
π¯1∆2 =
[
Rˆ12(p
1, p2)− Cˆ1p2(p
1, p2,∆) + s1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)]
ψ¯
2
∆2(∆
1,∆2, s1) =m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
∆2 (106)
dψ¯
1
ds1
= ψ¯
1
∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
s1 (107)
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and
dψ¯
2
ds1
= ψ¯
2
∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1 . (108)
where m1 ≡ p1− ∂C
1
∂x1
+ s1. The last two expressions capture the total eﬀect of the output subsidy on prices.
They take into account that the subsidy also aﬀects the choice of R&D by both ﬁrms in the second stage (and
these, in turn, aﬀect prices). This eﬀect (through R&D) is reﬂected in the ﬁrst two terms of the expression.
With these expressions we can rewrite ∂B¯
1
∂s1
:
∂B¯1
∂s1
=m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
s1 − s
1
[
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+
∂x1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
]
This is expression (60) in the main text.
F Proof of Lemma 6
Before proving the statement of the lemma, we need to derive the restrictions on φi11 implied by the second
order condition (52) and the stability condition (54).
From the deﬁnition of π¯i∆i∆i in (93), in order to satisfy the second order condition π¯
i
∆i∆i < 0 we need to
ensure
φi11 >
(
Πiii
)3 (
Cˆipi∆
)2
((
Πiii
)2
−
(
Πiij
)2)2
[
γ2 −
1
4
γ4 − 1
]
= θπ¯1∆1s1 > 0 (109)
where θ = −
Cˆi
pi∆
∂xi
∂pi
= −∂
2Ci(xi,∆i)
∂∆i∂xi measures how fast marginal costs are reduced per unit of R&D.
On the other hand, the stability condition in (54) translates into:
π¯i∆i∆i
π¯i∆i∆j
=
(Πiii)
3
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)
2
(
(Πiii)
2
−(Πiij)
2
)
2
[
γ2 − 14γ
4
− 1
]
− φ111
(
Cˆi
pi∆
)
2
(Πiii)
3
(
(Πiii)
2
−(Πiij)
2
)
2
[
−
1
2γ + γ −
1
4γ
3
] > 1
=
[
γ2 − 14γ
4
− 1
][
1
2γ −
1
4γ
3
] − φi11
π¯i∆i∆j
> 1 (110)
using (102):
φi11 + π¯
i
∆i∆j > π¯
i
∆i∆j
[
γ2 − 14γ
4
− 1
][
1
2γ −
1
4γ
3
]
φi11 > θπ¯
1
∆1s1 − π¯
i
∆i∆j > 0 (111)
Since πi∆i∆j < 0, then only (111) is binding..
From the deﬁnition of d∆1
ds1
and d∆
2
ds1
(98), (99) and the identities (103), (101), (100) and (102) we have
d∆1
ds1
=
−π¯i∆i∆i π¯
1
∆1s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
2
∆2s1(
π¯i∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2 =
(
−θπ¯1∆1s1 + φ
1
11
)
π¯1∆1s1 +
(π¯i
∆i∆j
)2
θ(
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2
=
1
θ
(
−
(
θπ¯1∆1s1
)2
+ φ111θπ¯
1
∆1s1 +
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2)
(
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2 > 0 (112)
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d∆2
ds1
=
−π¯i∆i∆i π¯
2
∆2s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j π¯
1
∆1s1(
π¯i∆i∆i
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2 =
(
−θπ¯1∆1s1 + φ
1
11
) π¯i
∆i∆j
θ
+ π¯i∆i∆j π¯
1
∆1s1(
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2
=
1
θ
φ111π¯
i
∆i∆j(
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2 < 0 (113)
Notice that all the terms in the expressions above do not depend on φ111 except, of course φ
1
11. Taking the
derivative with respect to φ111
∂ d∆
1
ds1
∂φ111
=
1
θ
θπ¯1∆1s1
[(
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2]
+ 2
(
−
(
θπ¯1∆1s1
)2
+ φ111θπ¯
1
∆1s1 +
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2) (
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)
((
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2)2
=
1
θ
−
(
θπ¯1∆1s1
)3
+ θπ¯1∆1s1
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2
+ 2φ111
(
θπ¯1∆1s1
)2
−
(
φ111
)2
θπ¯1∆1s1 − 2φ
1
11
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2((
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2)2
= −
1
θ
(
θπ¯1∆1s1
) (
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
+
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2 (
2φ111 − θπ¯
1
∆1s1
)
((
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2)2 < 0 (114)
∂ d∆
2
ds1
∂φ111
=
1
θ
π¯i∆i∆j
[(
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
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+ 2φ111π¯
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∆i∆j
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1
11
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1
11
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−
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π¯i∆i∆j
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θ
π¯i∆i∆j
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θπ¯1∆1s1
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− 2θφ111π¯
1
∆1s1 +
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φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2]
+ 2φ111π¯
i
∆i∆jθπ¯
1
∆1s1 − 2φ
1
11π¯
i
∆i∆jφ
1
11((
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2)2
=
1
θ
π¯i∆i∆j
[(
θπ¯1∆1s1
)2
−
(
φ111
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2]
((
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2)2
= −
1
θ
π¯i∆i∆j
[(
φ111
)2
−
(
θπ¯1∆1s1 − π¯
i
∆i∆j
) (
θπ¯1∆1s1 + π¯
i
∆i∆j
)]
((
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2)2
> 0 (115)
where the inequalities are derived using (111). Since d∆
1
ds1
> 0 and d∆
2
ds1
< 0, the statement of the proposition
follows
G Proof of Proposition 7
Rewrite the optimal subsidy as
s1∗ = m1
(
∂x1
∂p2
)
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+ ∂x
1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
(116)
where m1 = p1 − ∂C
1
∂x1
+ s1 > 0 is the gross beneﬁt per unit sold, including the output subsidy. Of course,
m1 has to be positive (otherwise ﬁrm 1 would have negative proﬁts).
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Turn now to the sign of the denominator in (116). It is positive since
∂x1
∂p1
dψ¯
1
ds1
+
∂x1
∂p2
dψ¯
2
ds1
=
∂x1
∂p1
(
ψ¯
1
∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
1
s1 +
(
∂x1
∂p2
∂x1
∂p1
)(
ψ¯
2
∆1
d∆1
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1
))
=
∂x1
∂p1
ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆1
ds1
+
ψ¯
i
∆j
ψ¯
i
∆i
d∆2
ds1
+
ψ¯
1
s1
ψ¯
i
∆i
− γ
(
ψ¯
i
∆j
ψ¯
i
∆i
d∆1
ds1
+
d∆2
ds1
+
ψ¯
2
s1
ψ¯
i
∆i
))
=
∂x1
∂p1
ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆1
ds1
−
Πiij
Πiii
d∆2
ds1
−
∂xi
∂pi
Cˆi
pi∆
− γ
(
−
Πiij
Πiii
d∆1
ds1
+
d∆2
ds1
−
ψ¯
1
s1
ψ¯
i
∆i
Πiij
Πiii
))
=
∂x1
∂p1
ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆1
ds1
−
∂xi
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2∂x
i
∂pi
d∆2
ds1
+
1
θ
− γ
(
−
∂xi
∂pj
2∂x
i
∂pi
d∆1
ds1
+
d∆2
ds1
+
γ
2θ
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=
∂x1
∂p1
ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆1
ds1
+
γ
2
d∆2
ds1
+
1
θ
− γ
(
γ
2
d∆1
ds1
+
d∆2
ds1
+
γ
2θ
))
=
∂x1
∂p1
ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆1
ds1
(
1−
γ2
2
)
−
γ
2
d∆2
ds1
+
1
θ
(
1−
γ2
2
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> 0 (117)
where the inequality comes from d∆
1
ds1
> 0 > d∆
2
ds1
(Proposition 4) and
(
1− γ
2
2
)
> γ2 > 0 for γ between zero
and one.
Therefore the sign of s1∗ is the same as the sign of ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1 .
Using equation (43) we have:
ψ¯
2
s1 = ψ¯
1
s1
dp2
dp1
(118)
Recall that
ψ¯
2
∆2
d∆2
ds1
+ ψ¯
2
s1 = ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆2
ds1
+
ψ¯
2
s1
ψ¯
i
∆i
)
= ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆2
ds1
−
ψ¯
1
s1
ψ¯
i
∆i
Πiij
Πiii
)
= ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆2
ds1
+
γ
2θ
)
(119)
Since ψ¯
i
∆i is independent of φ
i
11, then a change in φ
i
11 only aﬀects
d∆2
ds1
(i.e. the R&D stage eﬀect). From
lemma 6,
∂ d∆
2
ds1
∂φ1
11
> 0 and so ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆2
ds1
+ γ2θ
)
in decreasing on φi11. Left to show is that ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆2
ds1
+ γ2θ
)
can
be positive or negative for permissible values of φi11.
From (113) we have
d∆2
ds1
=
1
θ
φ111π¯
i
∆i∆j(
θπ¯1∆1s1 − φ
1
11
)2
−
(
π¯i∆i∆j
)2 < 0 (120)
And so limφ1
11
↗∞ ψ¯
i
∆i
(
d∆2
ds1
+ γ2θ
)
= ψ¯
i
∆i
γ
2θ < 0 and limφ1
11
↘
(
θπ¯1
∆1s1
−πi
∆i∆j
) ψ¯i∆i
(
d∆2
ds1
+ γ2θ
)
= +∞. By
continuity, the claim of the proposition follows.
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